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Abstract
Bolted is a new architecture for bare-metal clouds that en-
ables tenants to control tradeoffs between security, price, and
performance. Security-sensitive tenants can minimize their
trust in the public cloud provider and achieve similar levels of
security and control that they can obtain in their own private
data centers. At the same time, Bolted neither imposes over-
head on tenants that are security insensitive nor compromises
the flexibility or operational efficiency of the provider. Our
prototype exploits a novel provisioning system and special-
ized firmware to enable elasticity similar to virtualized clouds.
Experimentally we quantify the cost of different levels of se-
curity for a variety of workloads and demonstrate the value
of giving control to the tenant.
1 Introduction
There are a number of security concerns with today’s clouds.
First, virtualized clouds collocate multiple tenants on a sin-
gle physical node, enabling malicious tenants to launch side-
channel and covert channel attacks [21, 51, 54, 55, 67, 70, 81]
or exploit vulnerabilities in the hypervisor to launch attacks
both on tenants running on the same node [49, 65] and on the
cloud provider itself [74]. Second, popular cloud management
software like OpenStack can have a trusted computing base
(TCB) with millions of lines of code and a massive attack
surface [38]. Third, for operational efficiency, cloud providers
tend to support one-size-fits-all solutions, where they apply
uniform solutions (e.g. network encryption) to all customers;
meeting the specialized requirements of highly security sen-
sitive customers may impose unacceptable costs for others.
Finally, and perhaps most concerning, existing clouds provide
tenants with very limited visibility and control over internal
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operations and implementations; the tenant needs to fully trust
the non-maliciousness and competence of the provider.
While bare-metal clouds [27, 46, 48, 64, 66] eliminate the
security concerns implicit in virtualization, they do not ad-
dress the rest of the challenges described above. For example,
OpenStack’s bare-metal service still has all of OpenStack in
the TCB. As another example, existing bare-metal clouds en-
sure that previous tenants have not compromised firmware by
adopting a one-size-fits-all approach of validation/attestation
or re-flashing firmware. The tenant has no way to program-
matically verify the firmware installed and needs to fully trust
the provider. As yet another example, existing bare-metal
clouds require the tenant to trust the provider to scrub any
persistent state on the physical machine before allocating the
machine to other tenants.1
These issues are a major concern for “security-sensitive”
organizations, which we define as entities that are both will-
ing to pay a significant price (dollars and/or performance) for
security and that have the expertise, desire, or requirement to
trust their own security arrangements over those of a cloud
provider. Many medical, financial and federal institutions fit
into this category. Recently, IARPA, who represents a num-
ber of such entities, released an RFI [12] that describes their
requirement for using future public clouds; to “replicate as
closely as possible the properties of an air-gapped private
enclave” of physical machines. More concretely2 this means
a cloud where the tenant trusts the provider to make systems
available but where confidentiality and integrity for a ten-
ant’s enclave is under the control of the tenant who is free
to implement their own specialized security processes and
procedures.
By our definition the majority of computing demands are
not highly security-sensitive, thus providing a high-security
option within a commercially-viable future cloud must not
1See, for example, IBM Cloud’s security policy for scrubbing local drives
here https://tinyurl.com/y75sakn4. Note that scrubbing local disks can require
hours of overhead on transferring computers between tenants; dramatically
impacting the elasticity of the cloud.
2Per private communications with RFI authors.
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impact the efficiency of providing service to other tenants. Is
this possible? Can we make a cloud that is appropriate for
even the most security sensitive tenants? Can we make a cloud
where the tenant does not need to fully trust the provider?
Can we do this without performance impact on tenants who
are happy with the security levels of today’s clouds?
The Bolted architecture and prototype implementation, de-
scribed in this paper, demonstrates that the answer to these
questions is “yes.” The fundamental insight is that to imple-
ment a bare metal cloud only a minimum isolation service
need to be controlled by the provider; all other functionality
can be implemented by security-sensitive tenants on their own
behalf, with provider-maintained implementations available
to tenants with more typical security needs.
Bolted defines a set of micro-services, namely an isolation
service that uses network isolation technologies to isolate
tenants’ bare-metal servers, a provisioning service that installs
software on servers using network mounted storage, and an
attestation service that compares measurements (hashes) of
firmware/software on a server against a whitelist of allowed
software. All services can be deployed by the provider as a
one-size-fits-all solution for the tenants that are willing to
trust the provider.
Security sensitive tenants can deploy their own provision-
ing and attestation service thereby minimizing their trust in the
provider. The tenant’s own software executing on machines
(already trusted by the tenant), can validate measurements of
code to be executed on some newly allocated server against
her expectations rather than having to trust the provider. Fur-
ther, the tenant’s attestation service can securely distribute
keys to the server for network and disk encryption. Using the
default implementation of Bolted services, a tenant’s enclave
is protected from previous users of the same servers (using
hardware-based attestation), from concurrent tenants of the
cloud (using network isolation and encryption), and from fu-
ture users of the same servers (using network mounted storage,
storage encryption, and memory scrubbing). Further, a tenant
with specialized needs can modify these services to match
their requirements; the provider does not sacrifice operational
efficiency or flexibility for security-sensitive customers with
specialized needs since it is the tenant and not the provider
responsible for implementing complex policies.
Key contributions of this paper are:
An architecture for a bare-metal cloud that: 1) enables
security-sensitive tenants to control their own security while
only trusting the provider for physical security and availability
while 2) not imposing overhead on tenants that are security
insensitive and not compromising the flexibility or operational
efficiency of the provider. Key elements of the architecture
are: 1) disk-less provisioning that eliminates the need to trust
the provider for disk scrubbing (as well as the huge cost), 2)
remote attestation (versus validation or re-flashing) to pro-
vide the tenant with a proof of the firmware and software
running on their server and 3) secure deterministically built
firmware that allows the tenant to inspect the source code
used to generate the firmware.
A prototype implementation of the Bolted architecture
where all its components are made available by us open-
source, including the isolation service (Hardware Isolation
Layer [5, 36]), a deterministic Linux-based minimal firmware
(LinuxBoot [6,39], a disk-less bare-metal provisioning service
(Bare Metal Imaging [7, 57]), a remote attestation service
(Keylime [9, 73]), and scripts that interact with the various
services to elastically create secure private enclaves. As we
will discuss later, only the microservice providing isolation
(i.e., Hardware Isolation Layer ) is in the TCB and we show
that this can, in fact, be quite small; just over 3K LOC in our
implementation.
A performance evaluation of the Bolted prototype that
demonstrates: 1) elasticity similar to today’s virtualized cloud
(∼3 minutes to allocate and provision a physical server), 2)
the cost of attestation has a modest impact ∼25% on the pro-
visioning time, 3) there is value for customers that trust the
provider in avoiding extra security (e.g.,∼200% for some ap-
plications), while 4) security-sensitive customers can still run
many non-IO intensive applications with negligible overhead
and even I/O intensive BigData applications with a relatively
modest (e.g., ∼30%) degradation.
2 Threat Model
We describe the threats to the victim, a tenant renting bare-
metal servers from the cloud, and describe approaches taken
by Bolted to safeguards against them. We consider external
entities (hackers), malicious insiders in the cloud provider’s
organization and all other tenants of the server—both past
and future—as potential adversaries to the victim. We assume
that the goal of the adversary is to steal data, corrupt data, or
deny services to the victim by gaining access to the victim’s
occupied servers or network. Our goal is to empower the
tenant with the ability to take control of its own security; it
is up to the tenant to make the tradeoff decision between the
degree to which it relies on the provider’s security systems
versus the harm that it may suffer from a successful attack.
The cloud provider is always trusted with the physical se-
curity of the datacenter, thus any attacks involving physical
access to the infrastructure, including power and noise analy-
sis, bus snooping, or decapping chips [33, 34, 75] are out of
scope of a tenant’s control. The provider is also trusted for the
availability of the network, node allocation services, and any
network performance guarantees. We assume that the cloud it-
self is vulnerable to exploitation by external entities (hackers)
or a malicious insider (e.g., a rogue systems administrator)
but we trust the cloud provider’s organization to have neces-
sary systems and procedures in place to detect and limit the
impact of such events. For example, the provider can enforce
sufficient technical separation of duties (e.g., two-person rule)
such that a single malicious insider or hacker cannot both re-
flash all the node firmware in a data center and change what
hashes the provider publishes for attestation, have both physi-
cal and logical access to a node, or make unreviewed changes
to the provider’s deployed software, etc. Further, we assume
that all servers in the cloud are equipped with a Trusted Plat-
form Module (TPM) - a dedicated cryptographic coprocessor
required for hardware-based authentication [11].
We categorize the threats that the tenant faces into the
following phases:
Prior to occupancy: Malicious (or buggy) firmware can
threaten the integrity of a server, as well as that of other servers
it is able to contact. A tenant server’s firmware may be in-
fected prior to the tenant using it, either by the previous tenant
(e.g., by exploiting firmware bugs) or by the cloud provider in-
sider (e.g., by unauthorized firmware modification). If a server
is not sufficiently isolated from potential attackers there is
also a threat of infection between the time it is booted until it
is fully provisioned and all defenses are in place.
During occupancy: Although many side-channel attacks
are avoided by disallowing concurrent tenants on the same
server, if the server’s network traffic is not sufficiently iso-
lated, the provider or other concurrent tenants of the cloud
may be able to launch attacks against it or eavesdrop on its
communication with other servers in the enclave. Moreover,
if network attached storage is used (as in our implementation)
all communication that is not sufficiently secured between
server and storage may be vulnerable. Finally, there is a threat
to the tenant from denial of service attacks.
After occupancy: Once the tenant releases a server, the
confidentiality of a tenant may be compromised by any of
its state (e.g, storage or memory) being visible to subsequent
software running on the server.
3 Design Philosophy
The key goals of Bolted are: (1) to minimize the trust that a
tenant needs to place in the provider, (2) to enable tenants
with specialized security expertise to implement the function-
ality themselves, and (3) to enable tenants to make their own
cost/performance/security tradeoffs – in bare-metal clouds.
These goals have a number of implications in the design of
Bolted.
First, Bolted differs from existing bare metal offerings in
that most of the component services that make up Bolted can
be operated by a tenant rather than by the provider. A security
sensitive tenant can customize or replace these services. All
the logic that orchestrates how different services are used
to securely deploy a tenant’s software is implemented using
scripts that can be replaced or modified by the user. Most
importantly, the service that checks the integrity of a rented
server can be deployed (and potentially re-implemented) by
the tenant.
Second, while we expect a provider to secure and isolate the
network and storage of tenants, we only rely on the provider
for availability and not for the confidentiality or integrity of
the tenant’s computation. For tenants that do not trust the
provider, we assume that Bolted tenants will further encrypt
all communication between the their servers and between
those servers and storage. Bolted provides a (user-operated)
service to securely distribute keys for this purpose.
Third, we rely on attestation (measuring all firmware and
software and ensuring that it matches known good values) that
can be implemented by the tenant rather than just validation
(ensuring that software/firmware is signed by a trusted party).
This is critical for firmware which may contain bugs [24, 35,
40, 41, 71, 78] that can disrupt tenant security. Attestation
provides a time-of-use proof that the provider has kept the
firmware up to date. More generally, the whole process of
incorporating a server into an enclave can be attested to the
tenant. In addition, the tenant can continuously attest when
the server is operating, ensuring that any code loaded in any
layer of software (OS, applications and etc., and irrespective
of who signed them) can be dynamically checked against a
tenant-controlled whitelist.
Fourth, we have a strong focus on keeping our software as
small as possible and making it all available via open source.
In some cases, we have written our own highly specialized
functionality rather than relying on larger function rich gen-
eral purpose code in order to achieve this goal. For function-
ality deployed by the provider, this is critical to enable it to
be inspected by tenants to ensure that any requirements are
met. For example, previous attacks have shown that firmware
security features are difficult to implement bug-free – includ-
ing firmware measurements being insufficient [26], hardware
protections against malicious devices not being in place [59],
and dynamic root of trust (DRTM) implementation flaws [80].
Further, our firmware is deterministically built, so that the ten-
ant can not only inspect it for correct implementation but then
easily check that this is the firmware that is actually executing
on the machine assigned to the tenant. For tenant-deployed
functionality, small open source implementations are valuable
to enable user-specific customization.
Finally, servers are assumed to be stateless with all vol-
umes accessed on-demand over the network. This removes
confidentiality or denial of service attacks by the provider or
subsequent tenants of server inspecting or deleting a tenants
disk state. Bare-metal clouds that support stateful servers need
to either give the tenant the guarantee that a node will never
be preempted (problematic in a pay-for-use cloud model) or
ensure that the provider scrubs the disks (trusting the provider
and potentially requiring hours with modern disks). As we
will see, stateless servers also dramatically improve the elas-
ticity of the service.
4 Architecture
Bolted enables tenants to build a secure enclave of bare-metal
servers where the integrity of each server is verified by the ten-
ant before it is allowed to participate in the tenant’s enclave.
During the allocation process, a server transitions through
the following states: free, or not allocated, airlock, where
the integrity of the server is checked, after which it is either
allocated to a tenant’s secure enclave if it passes the integrity
check or rejected if it fails. In this section, we discuss the
Bolted components; their operations; the process of server al-
location, attestation, and the degrees of freedom in deploying
Bolted components to support different security requirements
and use cases.
4.1 Components
Bolted consists of four components which operate indepen-
dently and (in the highest-security and lowest-trust configura-
tions) are orchestrated by the tenant rather than the provider.
Isolation Service: The Isolation Service exposes interfaces
to (de)allocate servers and networks to tenants, and isolate
and/or group the servers by manipulating a provider’s net-
working infrastructure (switches and/or routers). Using the
exposed interfaces, the servers are moved to free or rejected
state as well – ensuring the servers are not part of any tenant-
owned network. These interfaces are also used to move the
servers to the airlock state (to verify if they have been com-
promised) or the allocated state (where they are available for
the tenant).
The Isolation Service uses network isolation techniques
instead of encryption-based logical isolation in order to en-
force guarantees of performance and to provide basic pro-
tection against traffic analysis attacks. Since the operations
performed by these interfaces (on the networking infrastruc-
ture) are privileged, the isolation service needs to be deployed
by the provider; if a tenant does not trust the provider, it can
further encrypt network traffic between their servers.
Secure Firmware: Secure firmware is crucial towards im-
proving tenant’s trust of the public cloud servers; it should
consist of following properties. First, it should be open-source,
so that it benefits from large community support in improving
its features and fixing any bugs and vulnerabilities. Second,
it should be deterministically built so that a tenant can build
the firmware from verified source code and independently
validate the provider-installed firmware. Third, it must scrub
server memory prior to launching a tenant OS – if the server
was preempted from a previous tenant, it must guarantee that
the previous tenants‘ code and data is not present in the mem-
ory. Finally, it must provide an execution environment for the
attestation agent in the airlock state.
We note that it is challenging to replace computer firmware;
even major providers are often forced to install huge binary
blobs signed by the hardware manufacturer with no access
to the source code. When firmware cannot be replaced, we
use the installed firmware for the minimum amount of time in
order to download our own secure firmware – and the servers‘
pre-installed firmware must support trusted boot [20].
While the overall Bolted architecture design supports the
attestation and security of both system firmware (e.g., BIOS or
UEFI) and peripheral firmware (e.g., GPU, network card, etc.),
there are no standardized and implemented methods to attest
those peripheral firmware to an external party. Early attempts
at standardization are underway, and we expect Bolted can
leverage them when they mature [68].
Provisioning Service: This service is broadly responsible
for three things – (1) initial provisioning of the server with
the software stack (i.e. secure firmware and attestation agent)
responsible for its attestation during the airlock state, (2)
provisioning of the server during the allocated state (i.e. the
server was successfully verified that it was not compromised)
with the intended software stack i.e. the operating system and
the relevant software packages, and (3) saving and/or deleting
the servers‘ persistent state when a server is released.
The Provisioning Service can be deployed either by the
provider or by tenants themselves. The latter option is valu-
able for security-sensitive tenants who do not want to trust
the provider with their operating system images or who want
to use their own (e.g., legacy) provisioning systems. The pro-
visioning service must provision the servers in a stateless
manner so that the tenants do not have to rely on (and trust)
the provider to remove any persistent state after the server is
released.
Attestation Service: The Attestation Service consists of
two parts: an attestation agent that executes on the server
to be attested, and an attestation server that maintains a pre-
populated database of known reliable hash measurements of
allowed firmware/software (i.e., a whitelist). This service is
used during the airlock and allocated states. The Attestation
Service can be deployed either by the provider or by the
tenant.
During the airlock state, the attestation agent (downloaded
from the Provisioning Service during initial provisioning) is
responsible for sending quotes3 of the firmware and any other
software involved during the boot sequence to the attestation
server to be matched against the whitelist. Depending on the
attestation result obtained from the attestation server, the state
of the attested server is changed to allocated or rejected. In
the case when the computer firmware cannot be replaced, the
trusted boot sequence measurement (until the secure firmware
is executed) must be supplied by the provider. Obtaining this
measurement is a one-time operation for each server, and this
whitelist can be published publicly by the provider.
In the allocated state, the attestation agent (installed on
the tenants’ OS) can continuously verify the software stack
running against the whitelist present on the attestation server
(also referred as Continuous Attestation). For continuous at-
testation to work, the software stack should be configured
such that it saves new measurements to the cryptoprocessor
upon observing any change/modification/access. The attesta-
tion agent periodically sends the new hash measurements of
software and configuration registered in the cryptoprocessor
to the attestation server; if attestation fails (i.e., when any ma-
licious activity is observed), the attestation server alerts the
3Hash measurements obtained from and signed by a secure cryptoproces-
sor such as TPM.
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Figure 1: Bolted’s Architecture: Blue arrows show state changes
and green dotted lines shows the actions during a state change.
attestation agent. Continuous attestation protects tenants both
against unauthorized execution of executables and against
malicious reboots into unauthorized firmware, bootloader, or
operating system. Note that continuous attestation is funda-
mentally more challenging in a provider-deployed attestation
service, as the runtime whitelist (e.g., hashes of approved bina-
ries allowed to be run on the node) must be tenant-generated;
we assume continuous attestation is only used by security-
sensitive tenants that deploy their own attestation service.
4.2 Life Cycle
The different Bolted components do not directly interact with
each other, but instead, are orchestrated by user-controlled
scripts. Figure 1 shows the life-cycle of a typical secure
server (in the case of security-sensitive tenant), which pro-
gresses through six steps: (1) The tenant uses the Isolation
Service to allocate a new bare metal server, create an airlock
network, and move the server to that airlock, shared with the
Attestation and the Provisioning networks; we need to isolate
servers in the airlock state from other servers in the same
state so that a compromised server cannot infect other un-
compromised servers. (2) The secure firmware is executed (if
stored in system flash) or provisioned onto the server along
with a boot-loader, attestation software agent, and any other
related software. With these in place, (3) the Attestation Ser-
vice attests the integrity of the firmware of this server. Once
initial attestation completes, (4) the tenant again employs the
Isolation Service to move the server from the airlock network.
If firmware attestation failed (5) it is moved into the Rejected
Pool, isolated from the rest of the cloud; if attestation was
successful, the server is made part of the tenant’s enclave by
connecting it to the tenant networks. In order to make use
of the server, further provisioning is required (6) so the ten-
ant again uses the Provisioning Service to install the tenant
operating system and any other required applications.
4.3 Use Cases
Figure 2 demonstrates the flexibility of Bolted using three
examples of users, namely; 1) Alice, a graduate student, who
wants to maximize performance and minimize cost and does
not care about security, 2) Bob, a professor, who does not trust
other tenants (e.g., graduate students) but is willing to trust
the provider, and 3) Charlie, a security-sensitive tenant, who
not only does not trust other tenants but wants to minimize
his trust in the provider.
Alice and Bob are willing to trust the provider’s network
isolation and storage security, and do not need to employ
runtime encryption and will not incur its performance burden;
nor will they need to expend the effort to deploy and manage
their own services4. Alice, further, uses scripts that do not
even bother using the provider’s attestation service, further
improving the speed that she can start up servers as well as
her costs if the provider charges her for all the time a server
is allocated to her.
Security-sensitive tenant Charlie deploys his own, poten-
tially modified, provisioning and attestation service. He does
not have to rely on the provider’s network isolation to protect
his confidentiality and integrity but can implement runtime
protections such as network and disk encryption. Moreover,
the attestation service can be used not only to protect him
from previous tenants, but also to maintain a whitelist of
applications and configuration, and to quickly detect any com-
promises in an ongoing fashion. The one area where Bolted
requires Charlie to trust the provider is for protecting against
denial of service attacks since only the provider can deploy the
isolation service that allocates servers and controls provider
switches. Trusting a provider, in this case, is unavoidable with
current networking technology, as the provider controls all
networking to the datacenter.
In addition to the cloud use cases, Bolted was designed to
be flexible enough to handle the use case of co-location facili-
ties [1, 4, 8] where the datacenter tenants temporarily “loan”
computers to each other to handle fluctuations in demand;
and this use case is, in fact, the primary one for which Bolted
is going into production currently. In this case, a single party
may be both provider and tenant. As an example, one party
might have a high demand on their HPC cluster, while another
party has spare capacity in their IaaS cloud; the isolation ser-
vice from the second party (the provider) could be used to
provision servers for loan to the first party, with attestation
and provisioning services (including provisioning-associated
storage) provided by the first party (the user).
Since the different Bolted services are independent, being
orchestrated by tenant scripts, it is straightforward for a tenant
to use capacity from multiple isolation services. The attes-
tation of Bolted is important to enable supporting untrusted
environments (e.g., research testbeds) alongside production
services. For tenants that use the standard Bolted provisioning
4Or mismanage, a more significant risk for less security-literate users.
Figure 2: Bolted deployment examples; purple boxes are provider-
deployed and greens are tenant-deployed. Alice and Bob trust the
provider-deployed infrastructure, while security-sensitive Charlie
deploys its own.
service, the use of network mounted storage by Bolted enables
them to use their own storage for persistence, making storage
encryption unnecessary. Because Bolted enables tenants to
deploy their own provisioning service, some tenants can use
custom provisioning services which install to local storage.5
When using their own infrastructure, the tenant and provider
are in the same organization. In this case, tenants trust the
provider, and hence network encryption is unnecessary. Ten-
ants are willing to make agreements with trusted partners
from whom they will be using servers; trusting the partner’s
isolation service makes network encryption unnecessary for
communication with servers obtained from it.
5 Implementation
We describe our implementation of the Isolation Service
(HIL [36]), Firmware (LinuxBoot [6]), Attestation Service
(Keylime [73]), and Provisioning Service (BMI [57]), and
explain how they work together as Bolted. All of these con-
stituent services of Bolted are open-source packages and can
be modified by tenants or providers to meet their specific
requirements.
Hardware Isolation Layer: The fundamental operations
Hardware Isolation Layer (HIL) provides are (i) allocation
of physical servers, (ii) allocation of networks, and (iii) con-
necting these servers and networks. A tenant can invoke HIL
to allocate servers to an enclave, create a management net-
work between the servers, and then connect this network to
any provisioning tool (e.g., [15, 19, 57, 63]). It can also let
tenants create networks for isolated communication between
servers and/or attach those servers to public networks made
available by the provider. HIL controls the network switches
5In this case, provisioning time is much larger and tenants are responsible
for scrubbing the local disk.
of the cloud provider and provides VLAN-based [45] network
isolation mechanism. HIL also supports a simple API for
Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) operations like
power cycling servers and console access; ensuring that users
cannot attack the BMC. HIL cannot be deployed by tenants
and must be deployed by the provider and is the only compo-
nent shared by tenants, that is not attested to. In our effort to
minimize this TCB we have worked hard to keep HIL very
simple (approximately 3000 LOC).
Because the provider is trusted for physical isolation and
security, it also acts as the source of truth for information on
servers in two ways. First, it maps each server’s HIL identity
to a TPM identity by exporting the TPM’s public Endorse-
ment Key (EK) through administrator-modifiable metadata
per server, ensuring that the tenant is able to confirm that the
tenant she received is indeed the one she reserved thus protect-
ing the tenant from any server spoofing attack. Second, HIL
exposes the provider-generated whitelist of TPM PCR mea-
surements, i.e., ones that relate to the platform components
like BIOS/UEFI firmware and firmware settings.
LinuxBoot: LinuxBoot is our firmware implementation
and bootloader replacement. It is a minimal reproducible build
of Linux that serves as an alternative to UEFI and Legacy
BIOS. LinuxBoot retains the vendor PEI (Pre-EFI environ-
ment) code as well as the signed ACM (authenticated code
modules) that Intel provides for establishing the TEE (trusted
execution environment). LinuxBoot replaces the DXE (Driver
Execution Environment) portion of UEFI with open source
wrappers, the Linux Kernel, and a flexible initrd based run-
time. Advantages over stock UEFI include: 1) LinuxBoot’s
open-source Linux devices drivers and filesystems have had
significantly more scrutiny than the UEFI implementations, 2)
its deterministic build enables easy remote attestation with a
TPM; a tenant can independently confirm that the firmware on
a server corresponds to source code that they compile them-
selves, 3) it can use any Linux-supported filesystem or device
driver, execute Linux shell scripts to perform remote attes-
tation over secure network protocols and mount encrypted
drives, simplifying integration into services like Bolted, 4) it
is significantly faster to POST than UEFI; taking 40 seconds
on our servers, compared to about 4 minutes with UEFI.
We chose LinuxBoot over alternatives like Tianocore [10]
– an open source implementation of UEFI because unlike
Tianocore it does not depend on hardware drivers provided
by motherboard vendors. In addition to the driver dependency
Tianocore also needs support of Firmware Support Package
(FSP) from processor vendors which are closed source bina-
ries or independent softwares like coreboot [2, 3] to function
as a complete bootable firmware. LinuxBoot does use FSP
however Heads which is our flavor of LinuxBoot is able to
establish root of trust prior to executing FSP thus ensuring
that FSP blob is measured into TPM PCR’s. This protects
from attacks that involve replacing a measured FSP with a
malicious FSP. Additionally, while LinuxBoot and Tianocore
both are open source projects, LinuxBoot is based on Linux, a
much more mature and widely used system with battle tested
code.
We have modified LinuxBoot such that it scrubs memory
before a tenant can use a server; a tenant that attests that
LinuxBoot is installed is guaranteed that subsequent tenants
will not gain control until the memory has been scrubbed since
the only way for the provider, or another tenant, to gain control
(or reflash the firmware) is to power cycle the machine which
will ensure that LinuxBoot is executed. Scripts integrated with
LinuxBoot download the attestation service’s client side agent,
download and kexec a tenant’s kernel (only if attestation has
succeeded), and obtain a key from the attestation service to
access the encrypted disk and network.
Keylime: Keylime is our remote attestation and key man-
agement system. It is divided into four major components:
Registrar, Cloud Verifier, Agent, and Tenant. The registrar
stores and certifies the public Attestation Identity Keys (AIKs)
of the TPMs used by a tenant; it is only a trust root and
does not store any tenant secrets. The Cloud Verifier (CV)
maintains the whitelist of trusted code and checks server in-
tegrity. The Agent is downloaded and measured by the server
(firmware or previously measured software) and then passes
quotes (i.e., TPM-signed attestations of the integrity state of
the machine) from the server’s TPM to the verifier. The Ten-
ant starts the attestation process and asks the Verifier to verify
the server. The Registrar Verifier and Tenant can be hosted by
the tenant outside of the cloud or could be hosted on a physi-
cal system in the cloud. Keylime delivers the tenant kernel,
initrd and scripts to the server (after attestation success) using
a secure connection between the Keylime CV and Keylime
agent. The script is executed by the agent to 1) make sure
the server is on the tenant’s secure network and 2) kexec into
tenant’s kernel and boot the server.
For tenants that do not trust the provider, Keylime sup-
ports automatic configuration for Linux Unified Key Setup
(LUKS) [13] for disk encryption and IPsec for network
encryption using keys bootstrapped during attestation and
bound to the TPM hardware root-of-trust. Also, Keylime in-
tegrates with the Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture
(IMA) [72] to allow tenants to continuously attest that a server
was not compromised after boot. IMA continuously maintains
a hash chain rooted in the TPM of all programs, libraries, and
critical configuration files that have been executed or read by
the system. The CV checks the IMA hash chain regularly at
runtime to detect deviations from the whitelist of acceptable
hashes.
Bare Metal Imaging: The fundamental operations pro-
vided by the Bare Metal Imaging (BMI) are: (i) disk image
creation, (ii) image clone and snapshot, (iii) image deletion,
and (iv) server boot from a specified image. Similar to virtual-
ized cloud services, BMI serves images from remote-mounted
boot drives, with server access via an iSCSI (TGT [77]) ser-
vice managed by BMI and back-end storage in a Ceph [79]
distributed storage system. When the server network-boots,
it only fetches the parts of the image it uses (less than 1%
of the image is typically used), which significantly reduces
the provisioning time [57]. BMI allows tenants to run scripts
against a BMI-managed filesystem which we use to extract
boot information (kernel, initramfs image and kernel com-
mand lines) from images so that they could be passed to a
booting server in a secure way via Keylime.
Putting it together: The booting of a server is controlled
by a Python application that follows the sequence of steps
shown in Figure 1. For servers that support it, we burn Linux-
Boot directly into the server’s SPI flash. Figure 1 shows an-
other case where we download LinuxBoot’s runtime (Heads)
using iPXE and then continue the same sequence as if Linux-
Boot was burned into the flash. We have modified the iPXE
client code to measure the downloaded LinuxBoot runtime
image into a TPM platform configuration register (PCR) so
that all software involved in booting a server can be attested.
When servers pass attestation, the Keylime Agent downloads
an encrypted zip file containing the tenant’s kernel, initrd, and
a script from Keylime server and unzips them. The zip file
also includes the keys for decrypting the storage and network.
After a server is moved (using HIL) to the tenant’s enclave,
the Keylime Agent runs the script file. The script stores the
cryptographic keys into an initrd file to pass it to the tenant’s
kernel and then kexecs into the downloaded kernel. After it
boots, the kernel uses the keys from the initrd file to decrypt
the remote disk and encrypt the network.
Keylime [73] and LinuxBoot [6] were previously created
in part by authors of this paper, and modified as discussed
above. While previously published, HIL [36] and BMI [57]
were designed with the vision of integrating them in the larger
Bolted architecture described in this paper.
6 Addressing the Threat Model
Here we discuss how, for security-sensitive tenants, Bolted’s
architecture addresses the threats in the three phases described
in Section 2.
Prior to occupancy: We must protect a tenant’s server
against threats from previous users of the server and isolate
it from potential network-based attacks until a server is fully
provisioned. To do this, Bolted uses attestation to ensure that
the firmware of the server was not modified by previous ten-
ants, and isolates the server in the airlock state (protected from
other tenants) until this attestation is complete. The determin-
istic nature of LinuxBoot enables tenants to inspect the source
code of the firmware, and ensure that it is trusted, rather than
just trusting the provider. Further, all communication within
the networks in the enclave is encrypted, using a key provided
by the tenant’s attestation service (e.g., Keylime), ensuring
that the server will not be susceptible to attacks by other
servers as it is provisioned. Since our current implementation
is unable to attest the state of peripheral firmware, there could
be malware embedded in those devices that could compromise
(a) LUKS overhead on RAM disk (b) IPsec overhead (c) Network mounted storage
Figure 3: Performance Impact of Encryption
the node. Disk and network encryption securely bootstrapped
by the TPM mitigate data confidentiality and integrity attacks
from malicious peripherals with external access like network
interfaces and storage controllers. System level isolation of
device drivers, as in Qubes6, could further be used to mitigate
the impact of malicious peripherals mounting attacks against
the node [32].
During occupancy: We must ensure that the server’s net-
work traffic is isolated so that the provider or other concurrent
tenants of the cloud cannot launch attacks against it or eaves-
drop on its communication with other servers in the enclave.
HIL performs basic VLAN-based isolation to provide basic
protection from traffic analysis by other tenants. However, a
tenant can choose to both encrypt their network traffic with
IPsec and shape their traffic to resist traffic analysis from the
provider and not rely on provider’s HIL. Keylime securely
sends the keys for encrypting networking and disk traffic di-
rectly to the node. Disk encryption ensures the confidentiality
and integrity of the persistent data even if the storage is under
the control of a malicious provider.
Continuous attestation can detect changes to the runtime
state of the server (e.g., unauthorized binaries being executed
or reboot to an unauthorized kernel) and notify the tenant
to take some action to respond. Response actions include
revoking the cryptographic keys used by that server for net-
work/storage encryption, removing it from the enclave VLAN,
and immediately rebooting the system into a known good
state and scrubbing its memory. While IMA only supports
load/read-time measurement (i.e., hashing) of files on the
system as they are used, most existing runtime protection
measures like kernel integrity monitoring [56], control-flow
integrity [25], or dynamic memory layout randomization [23]
are built into either the kernel image/modules, application
binaries, or libraries themselves. Thus, TPM measurements
created by IMA at runtime will demonstrate that those protec-
tions were loaded.
After occupancy: Once a server is removed from a tenant
enclave, we must ensure that the confidentiality of a tenant
is not compromised by any of its state being visible to subse-
quent software running on the server. Stateless provisioning
of the servers protects against any persistent state remaining
6https://www.qubes-os.org/
on the server and avoids any reliance on the provider scrub-
bing the disk if it preempts the tenant. Further, the tenant
can deploy its own provisioning service and ensure that the
provider has no access to that storage. If the tenant requires
the use of the local disks for performance reasons (e.g., for
big data applications), the server can use local disk encryp-
tion with ephemeral keys stored only in memory. As long as
the tenant attests that LinuxBoot is used, it knows that this
firmware will zero the server’s memory before another tenant
will have the opportunity to execute any code.7
7 Evaluation
We first use micro-benchmarks to quantify the cost of en-
crypted storage and networking on our system, then examine
the performance and scalability of the Bolted prototype, the
cost of continuous attestation and finally the performance of
applications deployed using Bolted under different assump-
tions of trust.
7.1 Infrastructure and methodology
Single server provisioning experiments were performed on
a Dell R630 server with 256 GB RAM and 2 Xeon E5-2660
v3 2.6GHz processors with 10 (20 HT) cores, using UEFI or
LinuxBoot executing from motherboard flash. All the other
experiments were conducted on a cluster of 16 Dell M620
blade servers (64 GB memory, 2 Xeon E5-2650 v2 2.60GHz
processors with 8 cores (16 HT) per socket) and a 10Gbit
switch. The M620 servers do not have a hardware TPM, so
for functionality, we used a software emulation of a TPM [43],
and for performance evaluation, emulated the latency to access
the TPM based on numbers collected from our R630 system.
HIL, BMI, and Keylime servers were run on virtual ma-
chines with Xeon E5-2650 2.60GHz CPUs: Keylime with 16
vCPUs and 8GB memory; BMI with 2 vCPUs and 8GB, and
HIL with 8 vCPUs and 8GB RAM. The iSCSI server ran on
a virtual machine with 8 vCPUs and 32GB RAM. The Ceph
cluster (the storage backend for BMI disk images) has 3 OSD
servers (each dual Xeon E5-2603 v4 1.70GHz CPUs, 6 cores
each) and a total of 27 disk spindles across the 3 machines.
The servers were provisioned with Fedora 28 images (Linux
7Note that we are assuming here that the provider cannot re-flash the
firmware remotely over the BMC.
Figure 4: Provisioning time of one server.
kernel 4.17.9-200) enabled with IMA and version 5.6.3 of
Strongswan [17] for IPsec. IPsec was configured in ’Host to
Host’ and Tunnel mode. The cryptographic algorithm used
was AES-256-GCM SHA2-256 MODP2048. The authenti-
cation and encryption were done through a pre-shared key
(PSK). IMA used SHA-256 hash algorithm. Cryptsetup util-
ity version 1.7.0 was used to setup disk encryption based on
LUKS – with AES-256-XTS algorithm. Unless otherwise
stated, each experiment was executed five times.
7.2 The cost of encryption
For security-sensitive tenants that do not trust a provider, they
must encrypt the disk and network traffic. To understand the
overhead in our environment, we ran some simple micro-
benchmarks.
Disk Encryption: Figure 3a shows the overhead of LUKS
disk encryption on a Block RAM disk exercised using Linux’s
“dd” command. While LUKS introduces overhead in this
extreme case, we can see that the bandwidth that LUKS can
sustain at 1GB for reads is likely to be able to keep up with
both local disks and network mounted storage delivered over
a 10Gbit network while write performance may introduce a
modest degradation at ∼0.8GB.
Network Encryption: Figure 3b shows the overhead of
IPsec using Iperf between two servers using both hardware-
based Intel AES-NI (IPsec HW) and software-based AES
(IPsec SW) and MTU’s of 1500 and 9000. We can see that
IPsec has a much larger performance overhead than LUKS
disk encryption, with even the best case of HW accelerated
encryption and jumbo frames having almost a factor of two
degradation over the non-encrypted case (CPU usage on our
infrastructure is between 60% and 80% of one processing
core for HW accelerated encryption). Additional tuning or
specialized IPsec acceleration network interfaces could be
used to boost performance [37]. We use hardware accelerated
encryption and jumbo frames for all subsequent experiments.
Network mounted storage: In our implementation we
boot servers using iSCSI which in turn accesses data from our
Ceph cluster. In Figure 3c we show the results of exercising
the iSCSI server using “dd”. Experimentally, we found that
increasing the read ahead buffer size on Linux to 8MB was
critical for performance, and we do this on all subsequent
experiments (the default size is 128KB). Since Ceph as the
backend storage reads data in 4MB chunks, increasing the
read ahead buffer size to 8MB results in higher sequential
read performance. As expected we find that LUKS introduces
small overhead on writes and no overhead on reads, while
IPsec between the client and iSCSI server has a major impact
on performance.
7.3 Elasticity
Today’s bare-metal clouds take many tens of minutes to al-
locate and provision a server [62]. Further, scrubbing the
disk can take many hours; an operation required for stateful
bare metal clouds whenever a server is being transferred be-
tween one tenant and another. In contrast, virtualized clouds
are highly elastic; provisioning a new VM can take just a
few minutes and deleting a VM is nearly instantaneous. The
huge difference in elasticity between bare-metal clouds and
virtualized clouds has a major impact on the use cases for
which bare-metal clouds are appropriate. How close can we
approach the elasticity of today’s virtualized clouds? What
extra cost does attestation impose on that elasticity? What is
the extra cost if the tenant does not trust the provider and need
to encrypt disks and storage?
To understand the elasticity Bolted supports, we first exam-
ine its performance for provisioning servers under different
assumptions of security and then examine the concurrency
for provisioning multiple servers in parallel.
Provisioning time: Figure 4 compares the time to pro-
vision a server with Foreman (a popular provisioning sys-
tem) [30] to Bolted with both UEFI and LinuxBoot firmware
under 3 scenarios: no attestation which would be used by
clients that are insensitive to security, attestation where the
tenant trusts the provider, but uses (provider deployed) attes-
tation to ensure that previous tenants have not compromised
the server, and Full attestation, where a security-sensitive
tenant that does not trust the provider uses LUKS to encrypt
the disk and IPsec to encrypt the path between the client and
iSCSI server. There are a number of important high-level re-
sults from this figure. First for tenants that trust the provider,
Bolted using LinuxBoot burned in the ROM is able to pro-
vision a server in under 3 minutes in the unattested case and
under 4 minutes in the attested case; numbers that are very
competitive with virtualized clouds. Second, attestation adds
only a modest cost to provisioning a server and is likely a
reasonable step for all systems. Third, even for tenants that
do not trust the provider, (i.e. LUKS & IPsec) on servers
with UEFI, Bolted at ∼7 minutes is still 1.6x faster than Fore-
man provisioning; note that Foreman implements no security
procedures and is likely faster than existing cloud provision-
ing systems that use techniques like re-flashing firmware to
protect tenants from firmware attacks.
Examining the detailed time breakdowns in Figure 4; while
we introduced LinuxBoot to improve security, we can see
that the improved POST time (3x faster than UEFI) on these
servers has a major impact on performance. We also see that
booting from network mounted storage, introduced to avoid
trusting the provider to scrub the disk, also has a huge impact
on provisioning time. The time to install data on to the local
disk is much larger for the Foreman case, where all data needs
to be copied into the local disk. In contrast, with network
booting, only a tiny fraction of the boot disk is ever accessed.
We also see that with a stateful provisioning system like Fore-
man, it needs to reboot the server after installing the tenant’s
OS and applications on the local disk of the server; incurring
POST time twice. While not explicitly shown here, it is also
important to note that with Bolted a tenant can shutdown the
OS and release a node to another tenant and then later restart
the image on any compatible node; a key property of elas-
ticity in virtualized clouds that is not possible with stateful
provisioning systems like Foreman.
We show in Figure 4 the costs of all the different phases of
an attested boot. With UEFI, after POST, the phases are: (i)
PXE downloading iPXE, (ii) iPXE downloading LinuxBoot’s
runtime (Heads), (iii) booting LinuxBoot, (iv) downloading
the Keylime Agent (using HTTP), (v) running the Keylime
Agent, registering the server and attesting it, and then down-
loading the tenant’s kernel and initrd, (vi) moving the server
into the tenant’s network and making sure it is connected to
the BMI server and finally (vii) LinuxBoot kexec’ing into
the tenant’s kernel and booting the server. In each step, the
running software measures the next software and extends the
result into a TPM PCR. Using LinuxBoot firmware, after
POST we immediately jump to step (iv) above.
While the steps for attestation where complex to implement,
the overall performance cost is relatively modest, adding only
around 25% to the cost of provisioning a server.8 This is an
8Moreover, given that performance is sufficient, we have so far made no
effort to optimize the implementation. Obvious opportunities include better
download protocols than HTTP, porting the Keylime Agent from python to
Rust, etc.
Figure 5: Bolted Concurrency
important result given a large number of bare-metal systems
(e.g. CloudLab, Chameleon, Foreman, . . . ), that take no se-
curity measure today to ensure that firmware has not been
corrupted. There is no performance justification today for
not using attestation, and our project has demonstrated that
it is possible to measure all components needed to boot a
server securely. For the full attestation scenarios (UEFI and
LinuxBoot), two more steps are added to the basic attestation
scenarios: (+i) loading the cryptographic key and decrypting
the encrypted storage with LUKS (+ii) establishing IPsec tun-
nel and connecting to the encrypted network. These two steps
are incorporated into Kernel boot time in Figure 4. We can
see that the major cost is not these extra steps but the slow
down in booting into the image that comes from the slower
disk that is accessed over IPsec.
Concurrency: Figure 5 shows (with UEFI firmware) how
Bolted performs, with and without attestation, as we increase
the number of concurrently booting servers (log scale). In both
the attested and unattested case performance stays relatively
flat until 8 nodes. In our current environment, this level of
concurrency/elasticity has been more than sufficient for the
community of researchers using Bolted. There is a substantial
degradation in both the attested and unattested case when we
go from 8 to 16 servers. In the unattested case, the degradation
is due to the small scale Ceph deployment (with only 27 disks)
available in our experimental infrastructure. For the attested
boot, the performance degradation arises from a limitation in
our current implementation where we only support a single
airlock at a time; attestation for provisioning is currently
serialized. While this scalability limitation is not a problem
for current use cases in our data center, we intend to address it
to enable future use cases of highly-elastic security-sensitive
tenants; e.g., a national emergency requiring many computers.
7.4 Continuous Attestation
Once a server has been provisioned, a security sensitive tenant
can further use IMA to continuously measure any changes
to the configuration and applications. The Keylime Agent
will include the IMA measurement list along with periodic
continuous attestation quotes. This allows the Keylime Cloud
Verifier to help ensure the integrity of the server’s runtime
state by comparing the provided measurement list with a
Figure 6: IMA overhead on Linux Kernel Compile
whitelist of approved values provided by the tenant. In the
case of a policy violation, Keylime can then revoke any keys
used for network or disk encryption; essentially isolating the
server. To evaluate IMA performance, we measured Linux
kernel 4.16.12 compile time with and without IMA with a
different number of processing threads. We use kernel compi-
lation as a test case for IMA because it requires extensive file
I/O and execution of many binaries. The IMA policy we used
measured all files that are executed as well as all files read
by the root user. To stress IMA we ran the kernel compile as
root such that all of its activity would be measured.9 Figure 6
shows the results in log scale; even in this unrealistic stress
test IMA does not impose a noticeable overhead.
Keylime can detect policy violations from checking the
IMA measurements and TPM quotes in under one second.
To simulate a policy violation, we ran a script on the server
without having a record of it in the whitelist, resulting in
an IMA measurement different than expected. This results
in Keylime issuing a revocation notification for the key of
the affected server used for IPsec to the other servers in the
system; the entire process takes approximately 3 seconds
for a compromised server to have its IPsec connections to
other servers reset and be cryptographically banned from the
network.
7.5 Macro-Benchmarks
Security-sensitive tenants using Bolted rely on network and
disk encryption to minimize their trust in the provider. Surpris-
ingly there is little information in the literature what the cost
of such encryption is for real applications. Is the performance
good enough that we can tolerate a one-size-fits-all solution
and avoid ever trusting the provider? Is the performance so
poor that it will never make sense for security-sensitive cus-
tomers to use Bolted?
Figure 7 (MPI) shows performance degradation results for a
variety of applications from the NAS Parallel Benchmark [22]
version 3.3.1: Embarrassingly Parallel (EP), Conjugate Gra-
dient (CG), Fourier Transform (FT) and Multi Grid (MG)
applications class D running in a 16 server enclave. We see
overall that these applications only suffer significant overhead
for IPsec, ranging from∼18% for EB, which has modest com-
9This policy and workload are very unlikely to be either useful or man-
ageable from a security perspective. We used them only as a stress test.
Figure 7: Macro-benchmarks’ performance
munication, to ∼200% for CG which is very communication
intensive. These results suggest that there are definitely work-
loads for which not trusting the provider incurs little overhead.
At the same time, a one-size-fits-all solution is inappropriate;
only tenants that are willing to trust the provider, and avoid
the cost of encryption, are likely to run highly communication
intensive applications in the cloud.
To understand the performance overhead for more cloud
relevant workloads, Figure 7 (Spark) shows the performance
of Spark [82] framework version 2.3.1 (working on Hadoop
version 2.7.7) running TeraSort on a 260GB data set. The
experiment is run in parallel in an enclave of 16 servers. Tera-
Sort is a complex application which reads data from remote
storage, shuffles temporary data between servers and writes
final results to remote storage. We can see a significant overall
degradation, of ∼30% for LUKS+IPsec. While this degrada-
tion is significant, we expect that security sensitive tenants
would be willing to incur this level of overhead. On the other
hand, this overhead is large enough that tenants willing to
trust the provider would prefer not to incur it, suggesting that
the flexibility of Bolted to provide this choice to the tenant is
important.
Our last experiment (Figure 7 (VM)) is based on virtualiza-
tion. An important application of bare metal servers is to run
virtualized software (e.g., an IaaS cloud). In this experiment,
we installed KVM QEMU version 2.11.2 on a M620 server as
the hypervisor. The virtual machine we run on the hypervisor
is CentOS 7 with Linux kernel 3.10.0. It has 8 vCPU cores
and 32 GB RAM. This is based on the observation [28] that
90% of virtual machines having ≤ 8 vCPU cores and ≤ 32
GB RAM. We run Filebench version 1.4.9.1 benchmark [76]
on 1000 files with 12MB average size on the virtual machine.
We can see that the performance of this benchmark is ∼50%
worse in the case of IPsec; a significant performance penalty.
While we would expect less of a degradation for regular VMs
(rather than ones running a file system benchmark), we can
see that a tenant deploying generic services, like virtualiza-
tion, should be very careful about the kind of workload they
expect to use the service.
8 Related Work
Our work on creating a secure bare-metal cloud was motivated
by a huge body of research demonstrating vulnerabilities due
to co-location in virtualized clouds including both hypervisor
attacks [21,49,65,74,81] and side-channel and cover-channel
attacks like the Meltdown and Spectre exploits [51, 54, 55, 67,
70].
There is a large body of products and research projects for
bare-metal clouds [27, 46, 48, 64, 66] and cluster deployment
systems [15, 42, 63, 69] that have many of the capabilities
of isolation and provisioning that Bolted includes. The fun-
damental difference with Bolted, as we have explained in
[60], is that we strongly separate isolation from provision-
ing and different entities (e.g. security sensitive tenants) can
control/deploy and even re-implement the provisioning ser-
vice. This structuring clearly defines the TCB that needs to
be deployed by the provider.
While it is often unclear exactly which technique each
cloud uses to protect against firmware attacks, a wide variety
of techniques have been used including specialized hardware
[16, 18], using a specialized hypervisor to prevent access to
firmware [31], and attestation to the provider [44, 47]. In
all cases, there is no way for a tenant to programmatically
verify that the firmware is up to date and not compromised by
previous tenants. Bolted is unique in enabling tenant deployed
attestation for bare-metal servers, where the measurement of
the firmware and software are provided directly to the tenant.
The static root of trust (SRTM) approach used by Bolted
requires all software to be measured in an unbroken chain of
trust. It would have been simpler for us to use dynamic root
of trust (DRTM), however, DRTM has additional chip depen-
dencies and, more importantly, been shown to be vulnerable
to attacks [80] and work of Kovah et. al has shown that it can
be used as an attack vector itself [52].
9 Concluding Remarks
We presented Bolted, an architecture for a bare metal cloud
that is appropriate for even the most security sensitive ten-
ants; allowing these customers to take control over their own
security. The only trust these tenants need to place in the
provider is for the availability of the resources and that the
physical hardware has not been compromised. At the same
time, by delegating security for security sensitive tenants to
the tenants, Bolted frees the provider from the complexity of
having to directly support these demanding customers and
avoids impact to customers that are less security sensitive.
To enable a wide community to inspect the TCB, all com-
ponents of Bolted are open source. We designed HIL, for
example, to be a simple micro-service rather than a general
purpose tool like IRONIC [63] or Emulab [19]. HIL is being
incorporated into a variety of different use cases by adding
tools and services on and around it rather than turning it into
a general purpose tool. Another key example of a small open
source component is LinuxBoot. LinuxBoot is much simpler
than UEFI. Since it is based on Linux, it has a code base
that is under constant examination by a huge community of
developers. LinuxBoot is reproducibly built, so a tenant can
examine the software to ensure that it meets their security
requirements and then ensure that the firmware deployed on
machines is the version that they require.
Bolted protects against compromise of firmware executable
by the system CPU; however modern systems may have
other processors with persistent firmware inaccessible to the
main CPU; compromise of this firmware is not addressed by
this approach. These include: Base Management Controllers
(BMCs) [58], the Intel Management Engine [29,53,61], PCIe
devices with persistent flash-based firmware, like some GPUs
and NICs, and storage devices [50]. Additional work (e.g.
IOMMU based techniques, disabling the Management En-
gine [14] and the use of specialized systems with minimum
firmware) will be needed to meet these threats.
The evaluation of our prototype has demonstrated that we
can rapidly provision secure servers with competitive per-
formance to today’s virtualized clouds; removing one of the
major barriers to bare metal clouds. We demonstrate that the
cost of not trusting the provider (network/storage encryption)
and of additional runtime security (continuous attestation)
varies enormously depending on the application. (In fact, we
are not aware of other work that has quantified the cost of net-
work encryption, disk encryption, and continuous attestation
with modern servers and implementation.) Results for HPC
applications vary from negligible overhead to three times
overhead for communication-intensive applications. Clearly
the public cloud becomes economically unattractive for ap-
plications with three times overhead unless there are no other
alternatives. However, we expect that the ∼30% degradation
we see for TeraSort is likely representative of many appli-
cations today. Such overheads suggest that the cost of secu-
rity is modest enough that security-sensitive customers will
find value in using cloud resources. At the same time, the
overhead is significant enough that the flexibility of Bolted
that enables tenants to just pay for the security they need is
justified. One surprising result is that our secure firmware,
LinuxBoot achieves dramatically better POST time than ex-
isting firmware; this is one of the few times in our experience
that additional security comes with performance advantages.
10 Acknowledgment
We would like to acknowledge the feedback of the anony-
mous reviewers and our shepherd, Dr. Nadav Amit. We would
like to thank Red Hat, Two Sigma and NetApp, the core in-
dustry partners of Mass Open Cloud (MOC) for supporting
this work. This project involved extensive efforts over many
years to integrate all the components together. We gratefully
acknowledge Jason Hennessey, Gerardo Ravago, Ali Raza,
Naved Ansari, Kyle Hogan, and Radoslav Nikiforov Milanov
for their significant contributions in development and their
assistance in the evaluations. Partial support for this work
was provided by the USAF Cloud Analysis Model Prototype
project, National Science Foundation awards CNS-1414119,
ACI-1440788 and OAC-1740218.
References
[1] ABOUT THE MGHPCC | MGHPCC. http://
www.mghpcc.org/about/about-the-mghpcc/.
[2] coreboot - payloads. https://doc.coreboot.org/
payloads.html.
[3] Coreboot minimal firmware. https://
doc.coreboot.org/.
[4] Equinix Private Cloud Architecture. https:
//www.equinix.com/solutions/cloud-
infrastructure/private-cloud/architecture/.
[5] Hil: Hardware Isolation Layer, formerly Hardware as a
Service. https://github.com/CCI-MOC/hil.
[6] LinuxBoot. https://trmm.net/LinuxBoot_34c3.
[7] Malleable Metal as a Service (M2). https://
github.com/CCI-MOC/M2.
[8] NWRDC | The Ultimate Solution to Simplify Your Data
Center. http://www.nwrdc.fsu.edu/.
[9] python-keylime: Bootstrapping and Maintaining Trust
in the Cloud. https://github.com/mit-ll/python-
keylime.
[10] What is TianoCore? https://www.tianocore.org/.
[11] Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Summary.
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/trusted-
platform-module-tpm-summary/, Apr. 2008.
[12] Creating a Classified Processing Enclave in the
Public Cloud |IARPA. https://www.iarpa.gov/
index.php/working-with-iarpa/requests-
for-information/creating-a-classified-
processing-enclave-in-the-public-cloud,
2017.
[13] Linux unified key setup. https://gitlab.com/
cryptsetup/cryptsetup/blob/master/README.md,
2018.
[14] me_cleaner: Tool for partial deblobbing of intel me/txe
firmware images. https://github.com/corna/
me_cleaner, 2018.
[15] Metal as a service(maas) from canonical. https://
maas.io/, 2018.
[16] Project Cerberus Architecture Overview.
https://github.com/opencomputeproject/
Project_Olympus/tree/master/
Project_Cerberus, Dec 2018.
[17] Strongswan. https://www.strongswan.org/, Oct.
2018.
[18] Titan in depth: Security in plaintext. https:
//cloud.google.com/blog/products/gcp/titan-
in-depth-security-in-plaintext/, 2019.
[19] D. S. Anderson, M. Hibler, L. Stoller, T. Stack, and
J. Lepreau. Automatic online validation of network
configuration in the emulab network testbed. In Auto-
nomic Computing, 2006. ICAC’06. IEEE International
Conference on, pages 134–142. IEEE, 2006.
[20] W. A. Arbaugh. Trusted computing. De-
partment of Computer Science, University of Mary-
land,[online][Retrieved on Feb. 22, 2007] Retrieved
from the Internet, 2007.
[21] A. O. F. Atya, Z. Qian, S. V. Krishnamurthy, T. L. Porta,
P. McDaniel, and L. Marvel. Malicious co-residency on
the cloud: Attacks and defense. In IEEE INFOCOM
2017 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications,
pages 1–9, May 2017.
[22] D. H. Bailey, E. Barszcz, J. T. Barton, D. S. Browning,
R. L. Carter, L. Dagum, R. A. Fatoohi, P. O. Freder-
ickson, T. A. Lasinski, R. S. Schreiber, et al. The nas
parallel benchmarks. The International Journal of Su-
percomputing Applications, 5(3):63–73, 1991.
[23] D. Bigelow, T. Hobson, R. Rudd, W. Streilein, and
H. Okhravi. Timely rerandomization for mitigating
memory disclosures. In Proceedings of the 22Nd ACM
SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, CCS ’15, pages 268–279, New York, NY, USA,
2015. ACM.
[24] Y. Bulygin, J. Loucaides, A. Furtak, O. Bazhaniuk, and
A. Matrosov. Summary of attacks against BIOS and
secure boot. Defcon-22, 2014.
[25] N. Burow, S. A. Carr, J. Nash, P. Larsen, M. Franz,
S. Brunthaler, and M. Payer. Control-flow integrity:
Precision, security, and performance. ACM Comput.
Surv., 50(1):16:1–16:33, Apr. 2017.
[26] J. Butterworth, C. Kallenberg, X. Kovah, and A. Her-
zog. BIOS Chronomancy: Fixing the core root of trust
for measurement. In Proceedings of the 2013 ACM
SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, CCS ’13, pages 25–36, New York, NY, USA,
2013. ACM.
[27] I. Cloud. Bare metal servers. https://www.ibm.com/
cloud/bare-metal-servers, 2018.
[28] E. Cortez, A. Bonde, A. Muzio, M. Russinovich, M. Fon-
toura, and R. Bianchini. Resource central: Understand-
ing and predicting workloads for improved resource
management in large cloud platforms. In Proceedings
of the 26th Symposium on Operating Systems Principles,
SOSP ’17, pages 153–167, New York, NY, USA, 2017.
ACM.
[29] M. Ermolov and M. Goryachy. How to hack a turned -
off computer, or running unsigned code in intel manage-
ment engine. https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-
17/materials/eu-17-Goryachy-How-To-Hack-
A-Turned-Off-Computer-Or-Running-Unsigned-
Code-In-Intel-Management-Engine.pdf, Dec
2017.
[30] Foreman. Foreman. https://www.theforeman.org/,
2019.
[31] T. Fukai, S. Takekoshi, K. Azuma, T. Shinagawa, and
K. Kato. BMCArmor: A Hardware Protection Scheme
for Bare-Metal Clouds. In 2017 IEEE International Con-
ference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science
(CloudCom), pages 322–330, Dec 2017.
[32] P. Z. Gal Beniamini. Over the air: Ex-
ploiting Broadcom’s wi-fi stack. https:
//googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2017/04/
over-air-exploiting-broadcoms-wi-fi_4.html.
[33] M. Guri, B. Zadov, D. Bykhovsky, and Y. Elovici. Pow-
erHammer: Exfiltrating Data from Air-Gapped Comput-
ers through Power Lines. arXiv:1804.04014 [cs], Apr.
2018. arXiv: 1804.04014.
[34] J. A. Halderman, S. D. Schoen, N. Heninger, W. Clark-
son, W. Paul, J. A. Calandrino, A. J. Feldman, J. Appel-
baum, and E. W. Felten. Lest we remember: Cold boot
attacks on encryption keys. In Proceedings of the 17th
USENIX Security Symposium, July 28-August 1, 2008,
San Jose, CA, USA, pages 45–60, 2008.
[35] J. Heasman. Rootkit threats. Network Security,
2006(1):18–19, 2006.
[36] J. Hennessey, S. Tikale, A. Turk, E. U. Kaynar, C. Hill,
P. Desnoyers, and O. Krieger. HIL: Designing an ex-
okernel for the data center. In Proceedings of the
7th ACM Symposium on Cloud Computing (SoCC’16),
Santa Clara, CA, Oct. 2016.
[37] A. Hoban. Using intel® aes new instructions and
pclmulqdq to significantly improve ipsec performance
on linux. https://www.intel.com/content/dam/
www/public/us/en/documents/white-papers/
aes-ipsec-performance-linux-paper.pdf, Au-
gust 2010.
[38] K. Hogan, H. Maleki, R. Rahaeimehr, R. Canetti, M. van
Dijk, J. Hennessey, M. Varia, and H. Zhang. On the
universally composable security of openstack. IACR
Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2018:602, 2018.
[39] T. Hudson. Linuxboot. https://github.com/
osresearch/linuxboot.
[40] T. Hudson, X. Kovah, and C. Kallenberg. ThunderStrike
2: Sith Strike. Black Hat USA Briefings, 2015.
[41] T. Hudson and L. Rudolph. Thunderstrike: EFI firmware
bootkits for Apple Macbooks. In Proceedings of the
8th ACM International Systems and Storage Conference,
page 15. ACM, 2015.
[42] IBM. Extreme Cloud Administration Toolkit —
xCAT 2.14.5 documentation. https://xcat-
docs.readthedocs.io/en/stable/index.html#,
2019.
[43] IBM. Ibm’s tpm 1.2. http://
ibmswtpm.sourceforge.net/, 2019.
[44] IBMcloud. Hardware monitoring and security con-
trols. https://console.bluemix.net/docs/bare-
metal/intel-trusted-execution-technology-
txt.html#hardware-monitoring-and-security-
controls, Apr 2018.
[45] IEEE Computer Society. IEEE standard for local and
metropolitan area networks media access control (MAC)
bridges and virtual bridged local area networks. Insti-
tute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, New York,
2018.
[46] A. W. S. Inc. Amazon EC2 Bare Metal
Instances with Direct Access to Hardware.
https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/new-amazon-
ec2-bare-metal-instances-with-direct-
access-to-hardware/, 2017.
[47] O. Inc. Oracle Cloud Infrastructure Security. Oracle
Cloud Infrastructure white papers, page 36, Nov 2018.
[48] Internap. Bare-metal AgileSERVER. http://
www.internap.com/bare-metal/, 2015.
[49] S. T. King and P. M. Chen. Subvirt: Implementing
malware with virtual machines. In Security and Privacy,
2006 IEEE Symposium on, pages 14–pp. IEEE, 2006.
[50] J. Kirk. Destroying your hard drive is the
only way to stop this super-advanced malware.
https://www.pcworld.com/article/2884952/
equation-cyberspies-use-unrivaled-nsastyle-
techniques-to-hit-iran-russia.html, Feb 2015.
[51] P. Kocher, D. Genkin, D. Gruss, W. Haas, M. Hamburg,
M. Lipp, S. Mangard, T. Prescher, M. Schwarz, and
Y. Yarom. Spectre attacks: Exploiting speculative exe-
cution. ArXiv e-prints, Jan. 2018.
[52] X. Kovah, C. Kallenberg, J. Butterworth, and S. Corn-
well. SENTER Sandman: Using Intel TXT to Attack
BIOSes. In HITB Security Conference, page 5, Amster-
dam, May 2014.
[53] A. Kroizer. Tpm and intel ® ptt overview.
http://tce.webee.eedev.technion.ac.il/wp-
content/uploads/sites/8/2016/01/AK_TPM-
overview-technion.pdf, Sep 2015.
[54] M. Lipp, M. Schwarz, D. Gruss, T. Prescher, W. Haas,
S. Mangard, P. Kocher, D. Genkin, Y. Yarom, and
M. Hamburg. Meltdown. ArXiv e-prints, Jan. 2018.
[55] F. Liu, Y. Yarom, Q. Ge, G. Heiser, and R. B. Lee. Last-
level cache side-channel attacks are practical. In 2015
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 605–
622, May 2015.
[56] P. A. Loscocco, P. W. Wilson, J. A. Pendergrass, and
C. D. McDonell. Linux kernel integrity measurement
using contextual inspection. In Proceedings of the 2007
ACM Workshop on Scalable Trusted Computing, STC
’07, pages 21–29, New York, NY, USA, 2007. ACM.
[57] A. Mohan, A. Turk, R. S. Gudimetla, S. Tikale, J. Hen-
nesey, U. Kaynar, G. Cooperman, P. Desnoyers, and
O. Krieger. M2: Malleable Metal as a Service. In 2018
IEEE International Conference on Cloud Engineering
(IC2E), pages 61–71, April 2018.
[58] H. Moore. A penetration tester’s guide to ipmi and
bmcs. https://blog.rapid7.com/2013/07/02/
a-penetration-testers-guide-to-ipmi/, Aug
2017.
[59] B. Morgan, E. Alata, V. Nicomette, and M. Kaâniche.
Bypassing IOMMU protection against I/O attacks. In
2016 Seventh Latin-American Symposium on Depend-
able Computing (LADC), pages 145–150, Oct 2016.
[60] A. Mosayyebzadeh, G. Ravago, A. Mohan, A. Raza,
S. Tikale, N. Schear, T. Hudson, J. Hennessey, N. Ansari,
K. Hogan, C. Munson, L. Rudolph, G. Cooperman,
P. Desnoyers, and O. Krieger. A secure cloud with
minimal provider trust. In 10th USENIX Workshop on
Hot Topics in Cloud Computing (HotCloud 18), Boston,
MA, 2018. USENIX Association.
[61] L. H. Newman. Intel chip flaws leave millions of
devices exposed. https://www.wired.com/story/
intel-management-engine-vulnerabilities-
pcs-servers-iot/, Nov 2017.
[62] Y. Omote, T. Shinagawa, and K. Kato. Improving Agility
and Elasticity in Bare-metal Clouds. In Proceedings of
the Twentieth International Conference on Architectural
Support for Programming Languages and Operating
Systems, ASPLOS ’15, pages 145–159, New York, NY,
USA, 2015. ACM.
[63] Openstack. Ironic. https://docs.openstack.org/
ironic/latest/, 2018.
[64] Packet. The promise of the cloud delivered on bare
metal. https://www.packet.net, 2017.
[65] D. Perez-Botero, J. Szefer, and R. B. Lee. Characterizing
hypervisor vulnerabilities in cloud computing servers.
In Proceedings of the 2013 International Workshop on
Security in Cloud Computing, Cloud Computing ’13,
pages 3–10, New York, NY, USA, 2013. ACM.
[66] Rackspace. Rackspace Cloud Big Data OnMetal. http:
//go.rackspace.com/baremetalbigdata/, 2015.
[67] K. Razavi, B. Gras, E. Bosman, B. Preneel, C. Giuffrida,
and H. Bos. Flip feng shui: Hammering a needle in the
software stack. In 25th USENIX Security Symposium
(USENIX Security 16), pages 1–18, Austin, TX, 2016.
USENIX Association.
[68] A. Regenscheid. Platform firmware resiliency guide-
lines. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-193,
May 2018.
[69] R. Ricci and t. E. Team. Precursors: Emulab. In
R. McGeer, M. Berman, C. Elliott, and R. Ricci, editors,
The GENI Book, pages 19–33. Springer International
Publishing, Cham, 2016.
[70] T. Ristenpart, E. Tromer, H. Shacham, and S. Savage.
Hey, you, get off of my cloud: exploring information
leakage in third-party compute clouds. In Proceedings
of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and commu-
nications security, pages 199–212. ACM, 2009.
[71] J. Rutkowska. Intel x86 considered harmful, 2015.
https://blog.invisiblethings.org/papers/
2015/x86_harmful.pdf.
[72] R. Sailer, X. Zhang, T. Jaeger, and L. van Doorn. De-
sign and implementation of a tcg-based integrity mea-
surement architecture. In Proceedings of the 13th
Conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume
13, SSYM’04, pages 16–16, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2004.
USENIX Association.
[73] N. Schear, P. T. Cable, II, T. M. Moyer, B. Richard, and
R. Rudd. Bootstrapping and maintaining trust in the
cloud. In Proceedings of the 32Nd Annual Conference
on Computer Security Applications, ACSAC ’16, pages
65–77, New York, NY, USA, 2016. ACM.
[74] W. K. Sze, A. Srivastava, and R. Sekar. Hardening Open-
Stack Cloud Platforms against Compute Node Compro-
mises. In Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Confer-
ence on Computer and Communications Security - ASIA
CCS ’16, pages 341–352, Xi’an, China, 2016. ACM
Press.
[75] J. Szefer, P. Jamkhedkar, D. Perez-Botero, and R. B. Lee.
Cyber defenses for physical attacks and insider threats
in cloud computing. In Proceedings of the 9th ACM
Symposium on Information, Computer and Communi-
cations Security, ASIA CCS ’14, pages 519–524, New
York, NY, USA, 2014. ACM.
[76] V. Tarasov, E. Zadok, and S. Shepler. Filebench: A flex-
ible framework for file system benchmarking. https:
//github.com/filebench/filebench/wiki, 2017.
[77] F. Tomonori and M. Christie. tgt: Framework for storage
target drivers. In Linux Symposium, 2006.
[78] H. Wagner, D.-I. M. Zach, and D.-I. F. M. A.-P. Linten-
hofer. BIOS-rootkit LightEater. 2015.
[79] S. A. Weil, S. A. Brandt, E. L. Miller, D. D. Long, and
C. Maltzahn. Ceph: A scalable, high-performance dis-
tributed file system. In Proceedings of the 7th sympo-
sium on Operating systems design and implementation,
pages 307–320. USENIX Association, 2006.
[80] R. Wojtczuk and J. Rutkowska. Attacking intel trusted
execution technology. Black Hat DC, 2009.
[81] Y. A. Younis, K. Kifayat, and A. Hussain. Prevent-
ing and detecting cache side-channel attacks in cloud
computing. In Proceedings of the Second International
Conference on Internet of Things, Data and Cloud Com-
puting, ICC ’17, pages 83:1–83:8. ACM, 2017.
[82] M. Zaharia, M. Chowdhury, M. J. Franklin, S. Shenker,
and I. Stoica. Spark: cluster computing with working
sets. In Proceedings of the 2nd USENIX conference on
Hot topics in cloud computing, HotCloud ’10, 2010.
